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HAWAIIAN BEACH ACCESS: A
CUSTOMARY RIGHT
"Et quidem naturali jure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et
aqua profluens et mare et per hoc litora maris. Nemo igitur ad
litus maris accedere prohibetur .... "I
Ours is a time of increasing recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance of natural resources and of their finite capacities. There is grow-
ing concern that our once bountiful assets, through abuse and exploita-
tion, are becoming depleted to the point of extinction. Recent
litigation evidences a trend towards treating certain lands2 as a unique
natural resource and the use thereof as a public right. This trend may
require a restructuring of traditional notions of real property law -to pro-
tect this newly recognized resource.3
Our shorelands and beaches4 have been made a recent focus of
considerable attention.5 Nowhere is this focus more acute than in the
island state of Hawaii.' With the advent of the jet age and the intro-
duction of reduced airfare to Hawaii, the annual influx of tourists who
visit and, in some cases, remain has grown in ten years from less than
eight hundred thousand to over three million.7 Consequently, high rise
condominiums and resort complexes have proliferated along the shore-
1. "By the law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea. No one, therefore, is forbidden
to approach the seashore. . . ." INsTrrrUTS 2.1. pr. (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Candlestick Prop., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) (shoreline property surround-
ing San Francisco Bay); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266
Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972) (tidal marshlands); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (lakefront wetlands); see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &
J. BANTA, TIm TAKING ISSUE 147-68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tim TAXING ISSUE].
3. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Takings].
4. See generally Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of the
Beaches, 24 SYRncusE L. REv. 967 (1973); Note, Saving the Seashore: Management
Planning for the Coastal Zone, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 191 (1973).
5. See note 12 infra.
6. Town & Yuen, Public Access to Beaches in Hawaii: "A Social Necessity", 10
HAwAnI B.J. 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Town]. See also F. BOSSELMAN & D. CAL-
LIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND UsE CONTROL 18-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
THE QUIET REVOLUTION].
7. STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPlENT,
DATA BOOK 141 (Sept. 1973).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
land,s and the amount of beach front property not committed to the
tourist industry has been significantly reduced. 9 Public use of once
accessible undeveloped shorelands is now effectively precluded by
kapul' signs and the enforcement of trespass law.
As evidence of the increased concern with the shorelands,"1 there
has been much litigation in the coastal states on the extent of the pub-
8. Since 1961, the number of hotel rooms has increased from 10,193 to 30,323
in 1970. TiE QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 18.
9. STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
DATA BOOK 102 (Sept. 1973); see THE QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 6, at 18-19.
10. Kapu means taboo. As used in Hawaii a kapu sign has the same effect as
a no trespassing sign. All subsequent translations of Hawaiian terms and phrases are
taken from M. PuKui & S. ELBERT, HAWAIIAN-ENGLISH DIC'TONARY (1965) and will be
included parenthetically within the text.
11. Necessary to an understanding of the problem of shoreland, beaches and ac-
cess is a description of the area commonly referred to as the "beach" and the extent
of public rights therein. Although not susceptible of precise delineation, the beach has
four general areas: the submerged lands, the wet sand area, the dry sand area and the
uplands.
The area under the navigable water extending seaward from the line of mean low
tide for three miles is submerged lands. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,
33-36 (1947). In United States v. California, the question of control of the submerged
lands was resolved in favor of the federal government. Id. at 34. See also United States
v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). How-
ever, in 1953 Congress relinquished to the states and their grantees the federal govern-
ment's right to the submerged lands. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C.A. §§
1301-15 (1964).
The wet sand area, also referred to as the tidelands or the foreshore, is generally
defined as the beach area lying between the lines of mean low tide and mean high tide.
Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-27 (1935). The state may grant
tidelands to private grantees, but members of the public may not be barred from exercis-
ing public trust rights on the privately owned tidelands. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney,
6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). See generally Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Public Trust Doctrine].
The dry sand area is generally defined as the area above mean high tide and below
the line of vegetation, which is the extreme seaward boundary of natural vegetation that
spreads continuously inland. See Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy of Public Use
of Beaches, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 967, 969 (1973). The extent of public rights in the
dry sand area has been the subject of recent litigation with most courts finding some
public right to use the dry sand area. E.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore.
584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). For the status of the dry sand area in Hawaii, see text ac-
companying notes 141-46 infra.
The area inland of the line of vegetation is generally defined as the uplands. The
problem of beach access concerns crossing the private uplands to reach the beach.
Hence, the upland area with which this note is concerned is bordered by the line of vege-
tation on one side and the public highway on the other.
For a concise report on the extent of public rights in the shorelands, see R. DEWS-
NUP, PUBLIC ACCESS RIGHTS IN WATERS AND SHORELANDS (National Water Commission
Legal Study 8-B, July 1, 1971).
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lic's right in the beaches, with decisions generally favorable to the pub-
lic. 12  Recently, attention has been focused upon the wet and dry sand
areas13 of the beach in an attempt to define precisely the nature of the
public's interest therein.' 4
In Hawaii, however, two recent supreme court cases have elimi-
nated 'the need for a precise definition of the wet and dry sand areas.'5
The entire area up to the line of vegetation, the "upper reaches of the
wash of the waves,"' 6 has been pronounced public land. In effect, the
beaches in Hawaii are owned by the state for the people.'7 On the
other hand, however, the question of the public's right to cross private
uplands to reach the beaches, while discussed in academic commen-
taries,' has never been litigated. Traditionally, the situation has been
treated as one of trespass with no consideration afforded to the public
right of access.' 9
Given the general right of the public to use the tidelands, under
the public trust doctrine,2 0 and Hawaii's recognition of the general pub-
12. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971);
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970);
County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Hawaii 1973); In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii
314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea,
61 NJ. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462
P.2d 671 (1969); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
In addition, there has been a wealth of commentary on the subject of public use and
ownership of beaches under the term of art "public access." See, e.g., Note, Public Ac-
cess to the Beaches: Common Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48
N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 369 (1973); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. Rnv. 564
(1970).
13. Seenote lIsupra.
14. Because use of the line of mean high -tide as the boundary between the wet
and dry sand areas (and hence between public and private land in most jurisdictions)
is an imprecise standard, much confusion has resulted in attempting to define its loca-
tion. Compare Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935), with
People v. William Kent Estate Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 156, 161, 51 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219
(1966).
15. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Hawaii 1973); .In re Ashford,
50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). See text accompanying notes 141-46 infra.
16. 517 P.2d at 62. The term "beach" as hereinafter used refers to the total area
lying between the line of mean low tide and the line of vegetation.
17. Town, supra note 6, at 5. The Ashford decision "guarantees far more beach
area to the public than the rule in other jurisdictions where the mean high water mark
is accepted as the boundary." Id.
18. Town, supra note 6; cf. Comment, Access to Public Lands Across Intervening
Private Lands, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 149 (1973).
19. Cf. State v. Jordan, 53 Hawaii 634, 500 P.2d 560 (1972). The recognition
of the public right of beach access will probably arise in an action of trespass wherein
a swimmer or surfer is sued for trespassing across private upland. See HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 771-1 (1968). His defense will be premised upon -the existence of a public right
of beach access.
20. See generally Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 11.
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lic ownership of the beaches,2 nonrecognition of the public right of
access would seem to amount to a de facto appropriation of public
land for private use. In fact, the denial of access would deprive the
beach use and ownership cases of all practical effect. Yet, at the same
time, the upland owner's property rights must be respected. Both the
Hawaii Constitution 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution dictate that no property may be taken without due process
of law and just compensation.2"
To obtain an effective balance between the conflicting demands
of the public and the upland owner, this note proposes that a customary
right doctrine be utilized to establish a public right of beach access and
that a traditional abandonment concept be applied to preserve upland
private property rights.24 Although other possible legal foundations
exist for -the right of access, 25 the customary right doctrine is the most
appropriate in the context of the history and jurisprudence of Hawaii. 6
When reasonable alternative beach access exists, however, the ele-
ments of the widely recognized equitable concept of abandonment
appear and the customary right is extinguished.
2 7
As an introduction to the customary right doctrine, an overview
of its genesis will be provided. Its modern viability will be examined in
the light of its recent utilization29 in Oregon to define a general public
easement in the dry sand area3° of the state's beaches. The aptness
of the doctrine to the Hawaiian situation will be considered against the
background of that state's unique historical setting, judicial precedents,
and its legislative approval, if not actual codification, of the doctrine
itself.3" The prerequisites for the application of the doctrine will next
be discussed.32 The focus will then narrow to the question of whether
beach access was an ancient established custom. Analogies will be
21. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
22. HAWAII CONsT. art. 1, §§ 4, 18.
23. See generally THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 2; Takings, supra note 3.
24. Future dispositions of state-owned upland property does not pose a problem.
"Prior to the disposition of any public lands, the board of land and natural resources
shall lay out and establish over and across such lands a reasonable number of rights-
of-way from established highways to the public beaches. . . in order that the right of
the people to utilize the public beach or beaches. . . shall be protected." HAWAII REv.
LAWS § 171-26 (Supp. 1973). This note deals only with the uplands that are presently
privately owned.
25. See note 147 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 71-107 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 159-71 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 36-53 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 58-68 infra.
30. See note 11 supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 71-99 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 100-07 infra,
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drawn to earlier cases dealing with piscary and water rights.33
To balance the discussion of the public right of access, considera-
tion will also be given to the upland owner's rights. The possible char-
acterization of the judicial establishment of such a right as an unconsti-
tutional taking of property will be discussed.14 Finally, an examination
of the equitable power of the Hawaii court will suggest a solution which
would preserve the upland owner's rights where reasonable alternative
access exists.3 5
Evolution of the Customary Right Doctrine
According to Blackstone
In his treatise on the development of the English law, Blackstone
referred to the lex non scripta, the unwritten or common law, and di-
vided it into three parts.36 Two of these parts are relevant to this dis-
cussion. The first he termed "general customs, or the common law." 37
These were "doctrines that are not set down in any written statute or
ordinance, but depend merely upon immemorial usage .... "38 To
constitute a universal common law, a rule must have been generally
used; proof of which is shown when it appears "that it hath been always
the custom to observe it."39  Therefore, to establish a general rule of
common usage, it was necessary to show that a practice had been uni-
versally observed throughout England from time immemorial.
Blackstone's second category was "particular customs, or laws
which affect only the inhabitants of particular districts."40  These par-
ticular customs or laws, peculiar to a local area, stand in contradistinc-
tion to the established general customs of the kingdom, for reasons no
longer remembered. 41  Before a particular custom was given the force
of a local law, its existence and legality had to be established as well
33. See text accompanying notes 111-40 infra.
34. See text accompanying notes 149-58 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 159-71 infra.
36. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARms *67. The third category, that of particular
laws observed only in certain jurisdictions, is of little relevance to this note, and will
not be expanded upon.
37. Id. at *68. As an example of a general common law, Blackstone cites the
law that the eldest son alone is heir to an estate.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *74. See generally J. GRAY, THE RuLE AAINST PERPETuinES §§ 572-
88 (4th ed. 1942); 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 935 (Rohan ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as PowELL]; Note, Public Access to the Beaches: Common Law
Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 369, 374-77 (1973).
41. 1 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *74. As an example of a particular cus-
tom, Blackstone cites the rule in certain boroughs that the youngest son shall inherit
tbe, estate, contrary to the veneral commog lw rule that thl eldest inherits. Id. At *75,
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as its construction in the context of the general common law.42  The
question of the existence of a local practice was within the province
of a jury." The court would, however, take judicial notice of any prior
adjudication thereof. 4 Once the existence of a particular custom had
been established, its legal worth was tested. Blackstone posited seven
prerequisites for the legality of a particular custom, 45 requiring that it
have been: used from time immemorial,46 continued,47 peaceable,4"
reasonable,49 certain,50 compulsory, 5' and consistent with all other par-
ticular customs.5 2  Finally, where the particular custom contradicted
the general common law, it was to be construed strictly.53 The effect of
each particular custom was limited to the area within which the prac-
tice arose and could not be extended by related usages.
Blackstone's particular custom doctrine has never achieved wide-
spread acceptance in American courts. 54  Until 1969, with the excep-
tion of Hawaii55 and New Hampshire,56 the American jurisdictions
which had considered the particular customs doctrine had elected to
utilize other legal formulations.57
42. Id. at *75.
43. Id. at *76.
44. Id.
45. Id. at *76-78.
46. To establish immemorial usage, it must appear that the particular custom
"[has] been used so long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Id.
at *76. This has been interpreted to mean a usage that predates the coronation of Rich-
ard I in 1189. J. LAwsoN, THE LAw OF USAGES AND CUSTOM 26 (1887). If a statute
exists that is contrary to a particular custom, then the particular custom cannot prevail,
the statute being prima facie evidence that the custom did not exist from time immem-
orial. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76-77.
47. To be continued, it is not necessary that the use be continuous, so long as the
right to use the custom is not interrupted by someone with a superior right. 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *77. Blackstone uses the example of the customary right
of certain inhabitants to water their cattle at a certain pool. Failure to use the right
to water cattle does not extinguish that right. Id.
48. The particular custom must be consented to, for it owes its existence to com-
mon consent. Id.
49. This requirement is best stated in the negative, that the particular custom not
be unreasonable. It is sufficient if no valid legal reason can be asserted against it. Id.
50. Certainty is required so that activity in compliance with the custom may be
well defined. Id. at *78.
51. Mandation indicates an even handed, universal compliance with the custom in
the community. No one person may disregard the particular custom. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at *78-79.
54. E.g., Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 61 A. 98 (1905); Gillies v. Orienta
Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1935), afj'd, 248 App. Div. 623,
288 N.Y.S. 136 (1936).
55. In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 315, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (1968).
56. Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H. 233 (1834).
57. See note 54 supra.
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Modem Revival of the Doctrine
In 1969, Blackstone's theory of particular customs was applied by
the Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay 5s In an
action to enjoin resort owners from constructing fences and other in-
provements in the dry sand area5 9 of their property, the court found
a public easement winch the state could enforce by requiring the re-
moval of fences and other obstacles. To avoid the possibility of piece-
meal litigation, the court chose not to rely on the theories of implied
dedication and prescription 60 used in the lower court to establish the
public easement."' Instead, because "[o]cean-front lands from the
northern to the southern border of the state ought to be treated uni-
formly," the particular custom doctrine was used. 2
Defining custom as "such a usage as by common consent and uni-
form practice has become the law of the place, or of the subject matter
to wuch it relates,""3 the Oregon Supreme Court resurrected the par-
ticular custom doctrine and expanded it to establish a statewide public
easement. 64 Blackstone's seven requirements 5 for the legality of a
particular custom were considered summarily by the court and found
to exist.66 Similarly, the court dispensed with the resort owners' two
major arguments against the use of the particular custom doctrine:
first, that the doctrine was unprecedented and had very little authority
in other jurisdictions; 67 and second, that because of the brevity of the
American political system, the public use in Oregon was not sufficient
to establish long continued usage. 68
The Thornton court expanded the utility of the particular custom
doctrine by giving it a regional application, even though it had origin-
58. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
59. See note 11 supra.
60. See note 147 infra.
61. 254 Ore. at 592-93, 462 P.2d at 675.
62. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
63. The Oregon Supreme Court used the Bouvier's Law Dictionary definition of
custom. Id. at 595, 462 P.2d at 677, quoting 1 BoUVEmR's LAw DICTIONAY 742 (Rawle's
3d rev. 1914).
64. 254 Ore. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
65. See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
66. 254 Ore. at 595-97, 462 P.2d at 677.
67. The response of the Oregon Supreme Court to this argument was "While
it is not necessary to rely upon precedent from other states, we are not the first state
to recognize custom as a source of law." 254 Ore. at 597, 462 P.2d at 677. The court
cited as the only authority the 1834 New Hampshire case of Perley v. Langley, 7 N.H.
233. Id.
68. The Oregon court took judicial notice of the fact that the "European settlers
were not the first people to use the dry sand area as public land." 254 Ore. at 598,
462 P.2d at 678. The court also implied that established usage from the beginning of
a state's political history would suffice.
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ally been premised upon and restricted to a more geographically con-
strained usage. The court demonstrated the distinct advantages of the
expanded doctrine over other established bases upon which the public
easement could have been founded. Although there has been some
criticism of the particular custom doctrine in Thornton,69 it illustrates
well the doctrine's modem revival. Furthermore, Thornton stands as
a landmark on the judicial route of establishing public rights in the
shorelands and beaches where reasonably possible.70
Development of the Hawaiian Customary Right Doctrine
In applying the particular custom doctrine in Thornton, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court found it necessary to revive and expand a doctrine
rarely utilized in the continental United States. In Hawaii, however,
the particular custom doctrine pervades the case law and reflects the
unique historical development of the land system and governmental
structure. Furthermore, there is legislative ratification of the doctrine
which mandates that Hawaiian customs be given legal effect.
Historical Setting
The earliest recorded history of Hawaii reveals a number of small
kingdoms with their own superstitious rules and taboos.7 1  Unification
occurred during the years from 1795 to 1810 when the warrior king,
Kamehameha the Great, conquered all of the Hawaiian Islands. After
selecting land for his own personal use, he distributed the remainder to
his warrior chiefs who, in turn, retained part and distributed the rest
to inferior chiefs. The resulting land system was remarkably similar
to the feudal system of ancient England. 2 Land tenure was insecure,
and a superior lord could dispossess an inferior at his pleasure.-3
The basic unit of Hawaiian property was the ahupuaa, which usu-
69. Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564, 583-85 (1970). The
author questions the Oregon Supreme Court's finding of a particular statewide custom
whereas Blackstone's treatment was restricted to narrowly confined geographic localities.
However, such an expansive custom doctrine is a part of the law of Hawaii. See text
accompanying notes 71-107 infra.
70. This concern is shared by the courts in other jurisdictions. See cases cited
note 12 supra. However, no other court, with the possible exception of the California
Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971), has issued a definitive decision affecting property statewide on the basis of an
isolated fact situation.
71. See J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE (1958); J. CHINEN, ORIGINAL LAND TI-
TLEs IN HAWAII (1961); R. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1778-1854 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as KUYKENDALL].
72. Town, supra note 6, at 13; see Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Hawaii 514, 519-
20 (1862).
73. KvYKENDALL, supra note 71, at 52,
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ally ran from the mountains to the sea, entitling the chief and his peo-
ple to obtain fish from the ocean and fuel, canoe timber, and birds from
the mountains.7 4 Within most ahupuaas were a number of subdivisions
called ills that existed for the convenience of the chiefs and were ad-
ministered by a konohiki (an agent of the chief; later used to refer
to the chiefs or landlords). The ilis, with the exception of the inde-
pendent ill kuponos,7r had no separate existence from the ahupuaa,
and the konohiki in charge of an ilX had to pay tribute to -the chief of
the ahupuaa. This feudal land system contained none of the traditional
English common law notions of real property. All real property was
held by the king with discretionary use thereof by the chiefs and kono-
hikis.
With the discovery of the islands in 1778 by Captain James Cook,
the isolation of Hawaii ended, and its entrance into the mainstream of
world economic activity began. By the beginning of the reign of Ka-
mehameha III in 1824, a large foreign population existed in Hawaii,
comprised primarily of individuals who were accustomed to owning
land in fee simple and, therefore, resented the right of the king and
the chiefs to dispossess them at will. As a consequence of their vigor-
ous opposition to the ancient land system, the Hawaiian Magna Carta
was promulgated in 1839.76 During the same year the rudimentary
beginnings of a civil code were issued.7 7  In 1840, Kamehameha III
drafted the first constitution of the Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands,
78
74. Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Hawaii 298, 300, 440 P.2d 95, 97 (1968).
75. The ili kuponos were independent of the ahupuaas in which they were located
and the konohiki of the iii kupono paid tribute and were responsible directly to the king.
Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 380-81 (1930).
76. The Declaration of Rights, otherwise known as the Magna Carta, was specif-
ically incorporated in the first Constitution of Hawaii in 1840. Preface to L. THURSTON,
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HAwArr at iii (1904). The Magna Carta stated in part,
"p]rotection is hereby secured to the persons of all the people, together with their
lands, their building lots, and all their property, and nothing whatever shall be taken
from any individual, except by express provision of the laws." L. THuRSTON, THE iFuN-
DAmENTAL LAW OF HAwArr 1 (1904) [hereinafter cited as THuRSTON]. This provision
within the Declaration of Rights did not grant title to land but simply prevented the
king and chiefs from dispossessing anyone from his property without cause. It was not
until after the Great Mahele in 1848 and a Land Commission award that title actually
vested. Kenoa v. Meek, 6 Hawaii 63 (1871). See text accompanying note 85 infra.
77. See THtJRSTON, supra note 76, at 21-23. These sections dealt with fisheries
and water rights. See text accompanying notes 108-40 infra.
78. Included within the constitution was the following principle: "The origin of
the present government, and system of polity is as follows: KAMEHAMEHA I, was the
founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the land from one end of the Islands
to the other, though it was not his own private property. It belonged to the chiefs and
people in common, of whom KAmEHAMEHA I was the head, and had the management
of the landed property. Wherefore, there was not formerly, as is not now any person
who could or can convey away the smallest portion of land without the consent of the
one who had, or has the direction of the kingdom." THUmSTON, supra note 76, at 3.
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thereby altering the structure of the government from an absolute mon-
archy to a constitutional one and acknowledging that "people had some
form of ownership in land, aside from an interest in the products of
the soil." 9  These first inroads into the power of the monarch were
the beginning of the imposition of a foreign system of government and
laws that only in certain instances recognized the ancient traditions
and customs of the Hawaiians.
In 1846 an act was passed establishing the Board of Land Com-
missioners to Quiet Land Titles which was charged with the responsi-
bility of investigating and arbitrating all the claims of private individuals
to rights in land. s° In response to this act, the Land Commission, as
the board became known, formulated guidelines,8 ' commonly known
as the Principles, within which the ancient land system and practices
of the Hawaiians were recognized. The Principles stated that the Land
Commission, "with an authorization to adjust all the past tenures in the
manner most equitable,"82 had adopted the whole power of the king
to confer and convey land to which equitable claims existed. The na-
ture of that power was the king's private right to participate in the own-
ership of land and not the public rights that he held as sovereign. These
public rights and powers that the Land Commission could not exercise
were listed in the Principles."' The Principles went on to state:
"[T]hese prerogatives, power and duties, His Majesty ought not, and
ergo, he cannot surrender. Hence the following confirmations of the
board, and the titles consequent upon them, must be understood sub-
ject to these conditions.1
84
Two years later in 1848, Kamehameha III and over 240 of the
79. J. CHINEN, ORIGINAL LAND TITLES IN HAWAII 8 (1958).
80. Law of Apr. 27, 1846, pt. I, ch. VII, art. IV, §§ 1-13, [1846] I Statute Laws
of His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands, at 107 (repealed 1854).
See [1925] Hawaii Rev. Laws Vol. II, App. at 2120 (omitted from [1935] Hawaii Rev.
Laws).
81. These guidelines were adopted by a resolution of the Hawaiian Legislative
Council in 1846. Resolution of Oct. 26, 1846, II Statute Law of His Majesty Kameham-
eha I, King of the Hawaiian Islands, at 81. See [1925] Hawaii Rev. Laws Vol. II,
App. at 2124-37 (omitted from [1935] Hawaii Rev. Laws) [these guidelines will be re-
ferred to in the text as Principles].
82. [1925] Hawaii Rev. Laws Vol. II, App. at 2128 (omitted from [1935] Ha-
waii Rev. Laws). Although title still remained in the king, the Land Commission was
to consider if there were any equitable bases for a particular claim. Id.
83. Within the public rights or "sovereign prerogatives" that the king held were
two important powers:
"3d. To encourage and even to enforce the usufruct of lands for the common good.
"4th. To provide public thoroughfares and easements by means of roads, bridges,
streets, etc. for the common good .... "Id. For the importance of the Principles, see
text accompanying note 122 infra.
84. [1925] Hawaii Rev. Laws Vol. II, App. at 2128 (omitted from [1935] Hawaii
Rev. Laws).
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highest chiefs and konohikis determined their interests in the lands of
Hawaii and effected a mahele (division) of the land between them-
selves.85 This division of land between the king and the chiefs was
made subject to the rights of the hoaainas (land overseers or care-
takers, tenants). Subsequent Land Commission awards confirming the
mahele, and royal patents contained express provisions preserving the
rights of the hoaainas in their capacity as tenants.
In 1850, fearful for the rights of the hoaainas, the legislature con-
firmed a resolution adopted by the Privy Council and awarded to hoa-
ainas fee title to any land they had occupied and had improved, subject
to Land Commission recognition."6 Within the legislation were further
guidelines, commonly known as the Further Principles, to guide the
Land Commission in making kuleana (small parcel of land) land
awards to the hoaainas. A statement of the traditional and established
rights of the hoaainas was included and it dictated that they were not
to be precluded from exercising these rights.87 Finally, in 1855 the
Land Commission was abolished. The courts assumed the role of ad-
judicating conflicting demands over land. The transition in the system
of land tenure was complete.
The subsequent history of the islands is a familiar one. A power
structure having been established, further inroads into the political
power of the monarch were simple. Finally, in 1893, the monarch was
overthrown, and a provisional government established. In 1894, the
short-lived independent Republic of Hawaii was proclaimed, only to be
85. This mahele did not convey title to any land. The chiefs and konohikis were
required to present their claims to the Land Commission to receive an award of the land.
In addition, -to receive a royal patent in fee simple from the Minister of the Interior
on these awards, the chiefs and konohikis had to pay an amount equal to one-third the
value of the unimproved land at the time of the award. Failure to file a claim with
the Land Commission prevented title from being transferred from the government.
Because of -the shortage of qualified surveyors at -the time of the Great Mahele, dis-
tribution of the land was accomplished 'by grant of whole parcels by the ancient name
of the ahupuaa or ili. In re Boundaries of Pulehunui, 4 Hawaii 239, 240 (1879). Sub-
sequently, when the land was surveyed, the surveyor was accompanied by several kam-
aaina (native-born, one born in a place) who told the surveyor where the ancient bound-
aries of the ahupuaa or ili had existed. The kamaaina witness rule developed from this
practice, and it allows the admission of reputation evidence by kamaaina witnesses in
land disputes. At the same time, it is a recognition that ancient Hawaiian customs and
traditions predated the introduction of the written language and that knowledge of such
customs have been handed down by word of mouth. Town, supra note 6, at 9-11.
86. Act of Aug. 6, 1850. See [1925] Hawaii Rev. Laws Vol. II, App. at 2141-42
(omitted from (1935] Hawaii Rev. Laws) [the guidelines in the legislation will be re-
ferred to in the text as Further Principles].
87. "The people shall.. . have a right to drinking water, and running water, and
the right of way. The springs of water, and the running water, and roads shall 'be free
to all, should they need them, on all lands granted in fee-simple . . ." [1925] Hawaii
Rev. Laws Vol. II, App. at 2142, as amended, HAwAnI REv. LAws § 7-1 (1968).
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supplanted in 1897 by the annexation of Hawaii to the United States.
Until her admittance into the Union in 1959, Hawaii was administered
as a territory of the United States.88
The swift transition in the space of 150 years from an absolute
monarchy to a sovereign state and the coalescence of English real prop-
erty concepts and traditional Hawaiian practices produced a unique
legal system. Whereas recognition was granted to certain English com-
mon law rules, established Hawaiian usages were retained as the foun-
dation of the national Hawaiian law. This situation has caused the
Hawaii Supreme Court to remark that "Hawaii's land laws are unique
in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom, practice and
usage.
8 9
Judicial Precedent Establishing the Doctrine of Customary Right
Although explicit recognition of Hawaiian general common law is
lacking, the Hawaiian courts have sanctioned particular ancient Hawai-
ian customs and usages and have given them the force of lawY0 Be-
cause of the strong influence of the foreign settlers, especially the Mas-
sachusetts missionaries, who brought with them the English common
law,91 English law was instrumental in the development of the national
law of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Nevertheless, the Hawaii courts have
adamantly stressed that there was no total incorporation of the English
common law into the national Hawaiian law. 92 Moreover, in a series
of early cases where questions of first impression were presented to
the Hawaii courts, the applicable English common law rules were re-
jected because of the existence of contrary established Hawaiian cus-
toms and because of the inappropriateness of the English common law
rule to the Hawaiian experience.93
88. See generally R. KUYKENDALL & A. DAY, HAwAII A HISTORY (2d ed. 1961).
89. In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 315, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (1968) (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Hawaii 1973); Branca
v. Makuakane, 13 Hawaii 499 (1901); Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Hawaii 514 (1862).
For a discussion of the distinction between general common law and a particular custom,
see text accompanying notes 36-42 supra.
91. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1342 (Hawaii 1973); Branca
v. Makuakane, 13 Hawaii 499 (1901).
92. The early Hawaii Supreme Court in Kake v. Horton, 2 Hawaii 209 (1860),
emphasized that "[w]e do not regard the Common Law of England as being in force
here eo nomine and as a whole. Its principles and provisions are in force so far as
they have been expressly, or by necessary implication, incorporated into our laws by en-
actment of the Legislature; or have been adopted by the rulings of the Courts of Record;
or have become a part of the common law of this Kingdom by universal usage; but no
farther." Id. at 211.
93. In Rex v. Tin Ah Chin, 3 Hawaii 90 (1869), a criminal proceeding for mur-
der in which the validity of a count in the indictment was challenged, the court stated,
"our practice has leaned in favor of the common law of England, where the same does
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Legislative Incorporation
In order to clarify the situation and to give direction to the court,
the legislature in 1892 passed a statute stating that "Itihe common law
of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is here-
by declared to be the common law of the Hawaiian Islands in all cases,
except as. . . fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by
Hawaiian national usage . . ,,9I The effect of this statute was to
require, as a matter of law, that the judiciary resort to the English
common law and apply it uniformly. However, where the court found
an established Hawaiian national usage that was contrary to the general
common law, they were free to use it. Thus, a unique legal formula-
tion of customary Hawaiian usages was retained. As the Hawaii Su-
preme Court in Branca v. Makuakane95 made clear: "[Tjhe question
here, unlike that in the United States, was not whether the court should
decline to follow [an English common law] rule, but whether it should
adopt a rule." 0
This statute and its successor, Hawaii Revised Laws (HRS) Sec-
tion 1-1, 97 seem a fair equivalent to codification of Blackstone's doc-
trine of particular custom with regional application." A general com-
mon law is recognized, but use of particular ancient practices, -traditions
and customs that had universal acceptance throughout the islands is not
precluded. The result is a statute that compels the use of an ancient
Hawaiian practice in contravention of the English common law. As
confirmation of the practice of employing Hawaiian customs, the
Hawaii Supreme Court stated recently, on an issue of first impres-
sion, "[]n the absence of kamaaina testimony or other evidence of
not conflict with the laws and customs of this Kingdom." Id. at 95 (emphasis added).
In Awa v. Homer, 5 Hawaii 543 (1886), the question of whether a royal patent issued
to two individuals created a tenancy in common or a joint tenancy was before the Ha-
waii Supreme Court. The English common law rule dictated that such a conveyance
created a joint -tenancy because of the feudal aversion to the division of an estate. The
Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the English common law rule, asserting that -the need
for such a rule ceased with the Great Mahele. Id. at 544.
94. Act of Nov. 25, 1892, to Reorganize the Judiciary Department, [18921 Laws
of Her Majesty Liliuokalani, Queen of the Hawaiian Islands, ch. LVII, § 5, as amended,
HAwAuI Rnv. LAws § 1-1 (1968) (emphasis added).
95. 13 Hawaii 499 (1901).
96. Id. at 505.
97. "The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American deci-
sions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as
otherwise ... fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage."
HAwAnI R v. ,LAws § 1-1 (1968).
98. The courts and legislature of Hawaii have been very aware of the process of
development of the English common law. Cf. McBryde Sugar Co. v, Robinson, 504 P,
20 1330, 1338 n.12 (Hawaii 197-3),
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Hawaiian custom relevant to the question, we resort to common law
principles .... -99
The Doctrine's Prerequisites
Throughout the development of the Hawaiian customary right
doctrine, the general requirements that Blackstone considered neces-
sary were recognized. 100 These same requirements are also necessary
under HRS Section 1-1.
In the 1858 case of Oni v. Meek,'0' the plaintiff, a hoaaina, was
asserting a right, based upon a claim of custom, to pasture his horses
on the kula (pasture land) land of the ahupuaa. The defendant
answered that before a claim on the ground of custom may be
sustained, "the custom attempted to be set up must appear to have
existed from time immemorial; to be reasonable, to be certain, and not
inconsistent with the laws of the land."' 0 2 Although the supreme court
rejected the claim, the custom doctrine was recognized.
Over a hundred years later, in State v. Zimring,'0 3 the Hawaii Su-
preme Court rejected the affidavit of one kamaaina witness'04 regard-
ing the existence of Hawaiian usage that gave title to land created by
a volcanic eruption to the shoreland owner, holding that the Hawaiian
usage required by HRS Section 1-1 was usage that in fact existed prior
to the incorporation of the English common law in 1892.105 There-
fore, at the very least, the custom alleged must be one that was estab-
lished and accepted throughout the islands before the date of the
enactment of the law, November 25, 1892.
To be consistent with Blackstone's theory, however, immemorial
usage should be determined relative to the beginning of Hawaii's po-
litical history, as evidenced by an institutionalized land tenure sys-
tem.' 6 In Hawaii the year 1846 is recognized as the time of the or-
99. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 62 (Hawaii 1973) (emphasis
added).
100. See Town, supra note 6, at 13-14. See notes 45-52 & accompanying text supra.
101. 2 Hawaii 87 (1858).
102. Id. at 90. The claim based upon custom was rejected because "the custom
contended for is so unreasonable, so uncertain, and so repugnant to the spirit of the pres-
ent laws ...... Id. Furthermore, the court took judicial notice of two facts. The
first, not viewed as conclusive, was evidence that horses, not native to the islands, were
first introduced to the ahupuaa concerned in 1833. Hence, the custom could not have
resulted from immemorial usage. Secondly, it appeared that after the passage of the Act
in 1850 establishing kuleana land for the hoaainas, the plaintiff contracted with the
konohiki for the right of pasturage. Id. at 89-91.
103. 52 Hawaii 472, 479 P.2d 202 (1970).
104. See note 85 supra.
105. 52 Hawaii at 475, 479 P.2d at 204.
106. Cf. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 596, 462 P.2d 671, 677
(1969). See also Town, supra note 6, at 14.
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ganization of the government.' 07 Therefore, any ancient custom,
practice or usage that was in existence throughout the Hawaiian king-
dom as of that date, neither abrogated nor changed by statute, should
establish a customary right and have the force of law.
Beach Access as a Customary Right
The nature and extent of beach access as a customary right can
be ascertained through an examination of cases concerning water and
piscary rights. The piscary and water rights'"8 were two fiercely con-
tested items after the Great Mahele. °9 The outcome of the cases
turned upon the recognition accorded ancient Hawaiian usage and cus-
tom and the interpretation of the Principles and Further Principles." 0
From the water right cases comes the doctrine that certain customary
Hawaiian practices recognized in the Principles and Further Principles
are inalienable rights that the sovereign must hold for the public. The
piscary right cases establish the existence of a customary right of beach
access to exercise fishing rights. Read together, the rules of the two
series of cases make it clear that the customary right of beach access
was a public right which the king as sovereign could not convey. As
a result, all land grants are subject to this right of access.
Public Rights-The Water Right Cases
In Peck v. Bailey,"' the plaintiffs, owners of a sugar plantation
and successors in title to the konohiki of an ahupuaa through which
ran a river, sought to enjoin the defendanf hoaaina from taking water
from the river to irrigate his taro patches." 2 The court concluded that
the defendant had title to his land and all rights appurtenant thereto,
including the right to water for his taro, because of the immemorial
use of water for the irrigation of taro patches." 3
Over sixty years later, in Territory v. Gay," 4 custom was similarly
relied upon when the territory of Hawaii, as the owner of low lands
adjacent to the river involved in Bailey, sued to enjoin the upstream
107. Rooke v. Nicholson, 1 Hawaii 508, 518 (1856).
108. See generally 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 4.4, 15.4 (1967);
1 W. HuTcaNs, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NnmTEEN WESTERN STATES 192-99
(1971).
109. The Great Mahele refers to the division of land between King Kamehameha
and the chiefs in 1848. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 81 & 86 supra.
111. 8 Hawaii 658 (1867).
112. The roots of the -taro plant is the basic ingredient in the production of poi,
the pastelike substance that is the staple item in the Hawaiian diet.
113. 8 Hawaii at 661-62.
114. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930).
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owner from diverting water from the river. The court defined appur-
tenant water rights as those which attached to the land by virtue of the
fact -that water was being used on those lands prior to the Land Com-
mission award. According to ancient Hawaiian custom, any water not
necessary to satisfy the appurtenant water needs of a land owner was
surplus and, therefore, belonged to the konohiki of the ahupuaa in
which the river originated. Both the English common law doctrine of
riparian rights115 and the prior appropriation doctrine116 were rejected
as unsuited to the agricultural conditions within the territory and con-
trary to established Hawaiian practice.
17
A judicial gloss was placed upon Gay in McBryde Sugar Co. v.
Robinson,"8 an action to determine the surplus water rights of owners
of the lands involved in Bailey and Gay. The Gay case was held to
be binding on the state of Hawaii with respect to the defendants Gay
and Robinson. However, the ruling was not conclusive as -to the water
rights of Gay and Robinson and of the state with respect to McBryde
Sugar Co." 9  In reaching its decision, the court found both the history
of the Great Mahele and the Principles and Further Principles enacted
by the Land Commission instrumental. Emphasis was placed upon the
third prerogative of the Principles, "[tio encourage and even to en-
force the usufruct of lands for the common good."' 0 The court con-
cluded "that the right to water is one of the most important usufructs
of lands, and . . . was specifically and definitely reserved for the
people of Hawaii for their common good in all of the land grants.''
Therefore, the state holds the right to running water in trust for the
Hawaiian public.
The court's analysis of Hawaiian law has led commentators to the
conclusion that:
The McBryde ruling must be considered one of the most significant
decisions handed down in Hawaii on the question of natural re-
source allocation. The relevance of McBryde to public access to
beaches lies in the Court's use of the 1847 'Principles Adopted by
the Land Commission' and the 1850 'Enactment of Further Prin-
ciples' to prove claims for land patents. According to McBryde
those principles represented an authoritative codification of Ha-
115. See generally 1 R. CLAnK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs §§ 15.2, 16, 19.1, 51.1-
.4 (1967).
116. See generally id. §§ 15.1, 18, 19.2, 51.5-.8.
117. 31 Hawaii at 399-400.
118. 504 P.2d 1330, a! 'd on rehearing, 517 P.2d 26 (Hawaii 1973), appeal dis-
missed sub nom., McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 94 S. Ct. 3164, cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
3183 (1974).
119. 504 P.2d at 1335.
120. See note 83 supra.
121. 504 P.2d at 1338,
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waiian land custom. 2
2
Even more importantly, McBryde stands for the proposition that
the Principles and Further Principles contain public rights to which all
land awards are subject. 23 Among those is the right of way and ease-
ment necessary for the common good.2 4 McBryde suggests that beach
access, if it existed as a customary right, is a public right and, like the
water right, is held by the state for the public.
Existence of Ancient Beach Access-The Piscary Right Cases
Essential to the entire question of a customary right of 'beach ac-
cess is the establishment of the existence of an access right in ancient
Hawaii. The extent to which such beach access existed can be deter-
mined from cases dealing with piscary rights and exclusive fisheries.
Fishing rights and fisheries were among the subjects of the first laws
passed by Kamehameha 111.125 In the Act of 1846, the fishing rights
were further delineated, and the fishing grounds within the reefs were
proclaimed to be the private property of the konohiki to whose ahupuaa
the fisheries had, by "ancient regulation," belonged. 2 " In 1851 two
acts were passed. One transferred to the people the government's pis-
cary right, 2 7 and the second denied 'the upland owner the right to any
superior fishing right.' 28
Upon admittance to the United States, the Hawaiian Organic
Act' required that the exclusive fisheries and fishing rights be
repealed.' 30 A provision was included, however, which allowed any-
one claiming a vested private right to a fishery to petition the attorney
122. Town, supra note 6, at 15 (emphasis added).
123. But see Territory v. Liliuokalani, 14 Hawaii 88 (1902), where the Hawaii Su-
preme Court, in reversing an order dismissing a demurrer to the territory's suit to enjoin
the defendant from removing sand and gravel from the tideland, -held that -the provision,
"koe nae ke kuleana o na kanaka" (reserving however the people's kuleana therein), in
a Land Commission award and a royal patent did not reserve public rights that the terri-
tory could protect but only private rights. In reaching -this holding, the court did not
refer to the Further Principles in construing the provision. The court did, however, re-
fer to the Principles and stated that the sovereign prerogative contained therein are "pub-
lic rights to which the grant is subjecL" Id. at 95.
124. See notes 83 & 87 supra.
125. THmRSTON, supra note 76, at 21-23.
126. Hawaii Civil Code § 387 (1859), as amended, HAwAII REv. LAWS § 188-4
(1968).
127. Hawaii Civil Code § 384 (1859), as amended, HAwAM REv. LAWS § 188-1
(1968).
128. Hawaii Civil Code § 393 (1859), as amended, HAwAI REv. LAws § 188-3
(1968).
129. Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 1-104, 31 Stat. 141.
130. Id. § 95.
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general for a condemnation proceeding.' In Carter v. Territory,3 2
the plaintiffs sought compensation pursuant to the Organic Act for an
exclusive fishery in the sea adjoining their land. The plaintiffs as-
serted conjunctively that the right was appurtenant to their land, that
it was based upon prescription, and that it was established by ancient
Hawaiian custom. 13 3  The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the claims
on all grounds, concluding that, with respect to the ancient Hawaiian
custom claim, the statutues defining the fishing rights abrogated any
rights based upon established custom. 34  The United States Supreme
Court reversed. 3 ' In an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes in a compan-
ion case,' 36 the Court stated:
The right claimed is a -right within certain metes and bounds
to set apart one species of fish to -the owner's sole use . . . . A
right of this sort is somewhat different from those familiar to the
common law, but it seems to be well known to Hawaii, and, if it
is established, there is no more theoretical difficulty in regarding
it as property and a vested right than there is regarding any ordi-
nary easement or profit a prendre as such. The plaintiff's claim
is not to be approached as if -it were something anomalous or mon-
strous, difficult to conceive and more difficult to admit. Moreover,
however anomalous it is, if it is sanction by legislation, if the stat-
utes have erected it into a property right, property it will be, and
there is nothing for the courts to do except to recognize it as a
right.' 3
7
Subsequently, in Bishop v. Mahiko,138 the Hawaii Supreme Court
was confronted with an attempt to quiet title -to a fishery that was ap-
purtenant to an ahupuaa originally granted to the plaintiffs predecessor
in title. It appeared from the record that the boundaries of the fisher-
ies in ancient Hawaii were not officially established or recorded; rather,
the boundaries, by verbal communication, were universally known and
understood to belong to the ahupuaas and ili kuponos, in accordance
with ancient practice. Furthermore, there were konohikis of certain
landlocked ili kuponos'39 who possessed fishing rights and a fishery
separate and distinct from the fishery of the ahupuaa in which the ili
kupono was located. It is apparent that, at least with respect to these
131. Id. § 96.
132. 14Hawaii465 (1902).
133. Id. at 467. A companion case, Damon v. Territory, involved the same three
grounds plus an additional one based upon an express grant of the fishery from the king.
14 Hawaii 465 (1902).
134. Id. at 473.
135. Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 (1906).
136. Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 (1904).
137. Id. at 158 (emphasis added). It may be argued that at least with regard to
property, the customary right doctrine has received Supreme Court recognition.
138. 35 Hawaii 608 (1940).
139. Id. at 650.
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landlocked ili kuponos, the right of access to the fisheries in the oceans
must have existed.
140
Precedent of Judicial Protection-The Beach Ownership Cases
That judicial protection be given to the customary right of public
access has been presaged by the two cases dealing with the ownership
of the beaches in Hawaii. These cases evidence a judicial concern over
the public's interest in the shoreland. The Hawaii Supreme Court, in
In re Ashford,"4 concluded that a royal patent issued by king Kame-
hameha V could not have conveyed land beyond the high water mark,
because of the customary- method of locating seaward boundaries of the
land. "'42 A royal patent provision, ma ke kai, was construed to mean
"along the upper reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidenced by
the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris left by the wash of
waves .... "143
In County of Hawaii v. Sotomura,,4 the same court reiterated its
Ashford holding of "upper reaches of the wash of waves" as the bound-
ary between public and private land, but redefined how it was .to be
established. It was broadly stated, "as a matter of law that where the
wash of the waves is marked by both a debris line and a vegetation
line lying further mauka [inland]; the presumption is that the upper
reaches of the wash of the waves. . . lies along the line marking the
edge of vegetation growth."'14  Moreover, the court evidenced its judi-
cial concern with ocean front property stating:
The Ashford decision was a judicial recognition of long stand-
ing public use of Hawaii's beaches to an easily recognizable bound-
ary that has ripened into a customary right. Cf. State ex rel.
Thorton v. Hay. . . . Public policy, as interpreted by this court,
favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawaii's
shoreline as is reasonably possible.
146
The recent Hawaii Supreme Court cases of Ashford, McBryde,
and Sotomura make it evident that recognition of a public right of
beach access can be best achieved through the use of the customary
140. The kamaaina witness rule may also be used to establish the customary right
of beach access. See note 85 supra. Testimony by kamaainas could be used to establish
the custom in ancient Hawaii regarding beach access. "[Pllaintiffs will have to find
enough kamaaina witnesses who can testify that a uniform custom of unrestricted access
prevailed throughout the Islands." Town, supra note 6, at 12.
141. 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968).
142. Id. at 316, 440 P.2d at 77. See note 14 supra.
143. Id. at 315, 440 P.2d at 77.
144. 517 P.2d 57 (Hawaii 1973).
145. Id. at 62.
146. Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added).
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right doctrine. 47  In an extra-judicial statement, the Chief Justice of
the Hawaii Supreme Court has emphasized the importance attached to
a Hawaiian custom. 148  More significantly, it is the public policy of the
147. The various theories that may be available to develop a public right of beach
access include implied dedication, prescription, way of necessity and the public trust doc-
trine. However, because there are distinct disadvantages to each theory, and because
the customary right doctrine is particularly suited for recognition of the public right of
beach access in Hawaii, this note focuses upon the customary right doctrine.
Implied dedication involves an assertion by the public at large that the nonpermis-
sive use of private property as public lands was made for a certain period. Gion v. City
of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); accord, Miller
v. Roy W. Heinrich & Co., 257 Ore. 155, 476 P.2d 183 (1970); Karb v. Bellingham,
61 Wash. 2d 214, 377 P.2d 984 (1963). See generally 6 POWELL, supra note 40, at
1 935-36.
Prescription involves basically the same elements as implied dedication with one
major exception. The use necessary to obtain an easement through prescription must
be adverse or under a claim of right. See Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches:
A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYRAcusE L. REv. 935 (1973). See also 3 POWELL, supra
note 40, at 7 413.
Inherent in both concepts of implied dedication and prescription is the restriction
of their applicability to a local area. The Oregon Supreme Court recognized this handi-
cap and discarded the theories of prescription and implied dedication and used the cus-
tomary right doctrine. See text accompanying notes 58-70 infra. Furthermore, the re-
percussion after Gion in California revealed another shortcoming in the theory of im-
plied dedication. Upland owners simply fenced off their property precluding any access
to beaches. See L.A. Times, Mar. 21, 1971, § C, at 1, col. 6. See also Note, This
Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to Califor-
nia Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1092 (1971).
The theory of a way of necessity involves a requirement that no other way exists
to reach a piece of property. See 3 POWELL, supra note 40, at 7 410. However, this
theory requires, in addition to necessity, unity of title in the servient and dominant es-
tates. Id. at 1 432-33. Although there is some authority to the effect that unity of
ownership may be based upon the original ownership by the government, the majority
of jurisdictions reject this approach. Id. at 17 443-44.
A public right of beach access may be inferred from the public trust doctrine. The
tidelands are held by the state in trust for the public and the public cannot be precluded
from using the tidelands. See note 11 supra. As a necessary adjunct to this public right,
a similar right of access to the tidelands must exist. However, the problem with this
approach is that it must be applied to property normally not associated with the public
trust. The doctrine was originally restricted to navigation and fishing. See Public Trust
Doctrine, supra note 11, at 475. There has been, however, some expansion of the doc-
trine to allow water-related uses of the tideland to be protected by the public trust and
it may be possible to structure an argument to obtain beach access through the public
trust doctrine. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 61 N.J.
296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972). See also Note, Environmental Law-Expanding The
Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REv. 316 (1972).
148. "We all know from our history that in the last century, a foreign system of
laws and government was imposed upon the Hawaiian people.
"The Hawaiians had a difficult time conforming to the European and Calvinist con-
cepts of conduct and property. . . . Yet, we were not victims of the courts but of the
standards the courts had to impose. Those standards have changed. ...
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highest court in the state to favor maximum utilization of the public
beaches. A logical development in achieving the objective of that pol-
icy would be to recognize the existence of a customary right of beach
access as a necessary usufruct of land that has ripened into an inalien-
* able public right.
The Balancing of Private and Public Rights
The recognition of a general public easement to cross private up-
lands to reach the beach should have favorable results for the public.
Overcrowding should be reduced on those beaches where public access
currently exists. Logically, greater utilization of beaches now gener-
ally inaccessible should occur. However, the recognition of such an
easement could pose serious problems for the upland owner who pur-
chased the land because of its proximity -to a 'beach circumscribed by
private property. The value of his property would be reduced, and
the physical condition of the land possibly impaired by a multitude of
bathers and surfers crossing his land.
The "Taking" Issue
To what extent would a judicial decision affirming the right of
public access be an unconstitutional taking of property?14 Although
the normal activity attacked as a "taking" under the due process clause
is legislative, certainly a state judicial decision changing an established
precedent could be equally subject to higher judicial review.150 For
example, in Hughes v. Washington,'5' wherein the accretion right of
tideland owners as successors in title to a federal grantee was at stake,
the United States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Washington
Supreme Court concluding that federal law controlled because of the
proximity of the land in question to the boundary of the nation.
"We must scrutinize the area of civil laws that are in conflict with Hawaiian inter-
ests-such as adverse possession. These laws were brought in by the haoles caucasians
who understood them." Speech by William Richardson, Chief Justice of the Hawaii Su-
preme Court, to Hawaiian Civic Clubs, Annual Convention Feb. 8, 1974, printed in
the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Feb. 14, 1974, opinion page.
149. Some commentators feel that traditional real property notions concerning the
"taking" issue must be scrapped, particularly where public rights are involved. See Ta
TAXING IssuF, supra note 2, at 256-65; Takings, supra note 3, at 150. However, in this
context traditional theories will suffice.
150. Cf. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-42
(1897); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26, 30 (Hawaii 1973) (Levinson,
J., dissenting).
151. 389 U.S. 290 (1967). See also Corker, Where Does The Beach Begin, And
To What Extent Is This A Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. Rnv. 33 (1966).
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Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, 15 2 approached the
issue in another manner. Conceding that property law is a local matter
to be determined by a state legislature or judiciary, he stated the test
to be applied:
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington. . . arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, we must
of course accept it as conclusive. But to the extent that it consti-
tutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of the
relevant precedents, no such deference would be appropriate.'
5 3
Whether or not a state court's decision was unpredictable should be,
then, a federal question, reviewable in the federal system.1
54
Justice Stewart's approach was relied upon in Hay v. Bruno, 5 an
action in federal district court before a three judge panel. In Hay, the
defendants from Thornton attacked the Oregon Supreme Court deci-
sion as an unconstitutional taking of property, alleging an unpredictable
change in Oregon property law. The three judge panel unanimously
dismissed the claim and found no unpredictable change in state law:
"[T]he action of the Supreme Court of Oregon was consistent with and
is supported by a number of decisions from other jurisdictions which
confirm the right of a state under similar circumstances to protect and
preserve its beaches for the benefit of the people."'150
This district court decision implies that reasonable state action re-
garding the shoreline and use thereof that changes a previous rule of
state property law will not be held to constitute a taking. The predict-
ability of a state court's decision may be determined in accordance
with national judicial trends. Moreover, use of the custom doctrine to
create prescriptive easements for public recreational use does not con-
stitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
15 7
In light of the Bruno and Sotomura cases, it would seem that a
judicial recognition of a customary right of public beach access in Ha-
waii would not be unpredictable. Demands for public use of the
beaches are receiving widespread judicial response.' 58 The court in
Hawaii has seen fit to protect and to enforce the public ownership of
the beaches. A logical extension of public beach ownership would be
152. 389 U.S. at 294-98.
153. Id. at 296.
154. Id. at 297.
155. 344 F. Supp. 286 (D. Ore. 1972). See text accompanying notes 58-70 supra.
156. 344 F. Supp. at 289 (emphasis added).
157. "The decision of a state court on a question of law, even though wrong and
contrary to previous decisions, does not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment merely because it is wrong or because it reverses earlier decisions (citation omit-
ted)." Id.
158. See cases cited note 12 supra.
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the public's correlative right to get to the beach. Public policy should
dictate recognition of such a public right of access.
Extinguishment of the Access Right
The primary public policy objective of maximum utilization of the
beaches is achieved when the public has reasonable access. Beyond
this, an equitable approach that effectively balances public and private
rights might well allow curtailment or modification of a public ease-
ment. It is within the equitable powers of a Hawaii court to fashion
a remedy that weighs both the need for reasonable beach access and
preservation of the upland owner's rights.
Under traditional legal analysis," 9 an easement or right of way
may be extinguished by several methods.' 60 In Goo v. Young,16' an
action for damages and ejectment from land over which the defendant
claimed an easement, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had
abandoned the easement because of nonuser and because the defen-
dant and his predecessor in title had allowed the plaintiffs and their
predecessors in title to obstruct the easement. The Hawaii Supreme
Court found no abandonment of the easement since retention of the
easement is not conditioned upon continued use thereof. However,
the court noted that any easement might be extinguished by abandon-
ment with nonuser as one factor tending to establish the controlling ele-
ment, the intention to abandon.'62  In addition, the court asserted that
159. See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.87-8.104 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952); 3 PowELL, supra note 40, at 1 421-26; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 497-
509 (1944). Although some cases make a distinction between easements obtained by
deed and those obtained through operation of law, such distinction is without meaning.
See 3 POwELL, supra note 40, 423, at 526-34. Furthermore, since it is more difficult
to extinguish an easement obtained by deed, any rule that would allow an express ease-
ment to be extinguished would likewise apply to an easement obtained through operation
of law, such as a right of beach access obtained through the customary right doctrine.
The main obstacle to the extinguishment of a public easement is the question of
whether the public as a whole may lose such a right. However, where the public evi-
dences an intent to abandon an easement, a public easement may be extinguished. See,
e.g., Porter v. International Bridge Co., 200 N.Y.2d 234, 93 N.E. 716 (1910). See also
2 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952). There is no reason why
an easement held by the public cannot be lost if the public is capable of obtaining an
easement. Cf. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1970). Likewise, the law regarding extinguishment of easements should also apply
to general public easements.
160. Of these methods, the least likely to succeed is that of adverse possession. The
public right of way is a public right held by the state, and under the rationale of Mc-
Bryde adverse possession does not operate against the sovereign as trustee of public
rights. '104 P.2d at 1344-45.
16!. 36 Hawaii 132 (1942).
162. Id. at 148-49. See also Suzuki v. Garvey, 39 Hawaii 482 (1952); 3 POWELL.
supra note 40, % 423, at 526.32.
January 1975] HAWAIIAN BEACH ACCESS
all the elements of equitable estoppel must exist to establish an
abandonment of an easement.'6
3
In the situation where reasonable" 4 alternative public access cur-
rently exists 65 and the public has utilized that right of way, it is ex-
tremely likely that the general customary right of public access over
adjacent private uplands has been extinguished. Evidence of the pub-
lic's collective intention to abandon this customary right of access is pre-
sent. Nonuser of the general easement has occurred. In addition, the
permanent substitution and use of a defined right of way for the custo-
mary right is also indicative of the intention to abandon.' 66 Further-
more, all the elements of estoppel are present. 1 7  The upland owner,
relying upon the acquiescence of the public in using the defined, exist-
ing right of way in lieu of asserting their customary right of beach ac-
cess, may have incurred expenses in improving his property in the
belief that his land was his to enjoy.16 To allow the public to assert
its general access right in this context would cause "unreasonable harm
to the owner of the servient tenement."' 69  Therefore, where reason-
able alternative public access exists, the customary right of public ac-
cess to the beaches has been extinguished.
However, where no reasonable public access exists, no extinguish-
ment has occurred. 1 0 The requisites for extinguishment are simply
not present. With respect to these uplands, -the customary right of pub-
lic access continues to exist and may be asserted by the public. When,
163. 36 Hawaii at 149. The Hawaii court seems to have combined two separate
theories for extinguishment of an easement, in spite of Powell's contention that they
should remain distinct. 3 POWELL, supra note 40, 423, at 526.38. The two theories
are extinguishment by abandonment, wherein the material factor is the easement owner's
intention, and extinguishment by estoppel, wherein the action of the dominant and
servient estates' owners are controlling. Id. at 526.50. See also C. CLARK, REAL COVE-
NANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WiTH LAND" 35 (2d ed. 1947).
164. Reasonableness of the accessibility of the beach may be determined in the
same manner as that utilized for the reasonableness of the beach access which is pro-
vided when there is a sale or lease of state owned upland property. See note 24 supra.
165. It is immaterial for this analysis whether access was acquired through dedica-
tion or condemnation.
166. See Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. 439, 39 A. 803 (1898); Les v. Alibozek, 269
Mass. 153, 168 N.E. 919 (1929). See also Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1265 § 13 (1952).
167. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 505 (1944).
168. See 3 POWELL, supra note 40, 425, at 526.51.
169. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 505 (1944).
170. A Hawaii court sitting in equity "has plenary power to mold its decrees in
such form as to conserve the equities of all parties .... ." Fleming v. Napili Kai, Ltd.,
50 Hawaii 66, 70, 430 P.2d 316, 319 (1967), quoting Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rog-
ers P. & H. Co., 228 Ala. 612, 619, 154 So. 591, 597 (1934). Therefore, it is within
the court's power to decree that the general public easement is extinguished only when
public access has been provided and the public has acquiesced therein. Cf. Baptist
Church v. Urquhart, 406 Pa. 620, 178 A.2d 583 (1962).
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however, reasonable alternative public access is provided, and the pub-
lic makes use thereof, a waiver of the public right occurs and the cus-
tomary right may no longer be asserted. 17
Such an approach to the problem of balancing the competing de-
mands of the upland owner and the public adequately recognizes and
protects the rights and expectations of both sides. The public's owner-
ship of the beaches is given vitality by allowing the public -to reach
them; the upland owner's right to quiet enjoyment of his land is pro-
tected wherever the public has a reasonable alternative means to utilize
the beaches.
Conclusion
In an island state circled with a wealth of public beaches uncom-
monly suited for recreational purposes, the use and enjoyment of the
shorelands should be encouraged. The first step toward the accom-
plishment of this objective has taken place. The Hawaii Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed the public's customary right of beach
ownership. However, the second step, the recognition of a public right
of beach access has not yet been sought from the court. It is necessary
to insure beneficial enjoyment of the beaches that such an access right
be recognized.
Through the use of the doctrine of ancient Hawaiian customary
rights, this public right of beach access can best be established. Hoary
common law property notions should be ignored as irrelevant to the
Hawaiian experience and traditional Hawaiian practices that recognized
the public nature of the shorelines given consideration. Coupling the
customary rights doctrine with an abandonment theory allows the Ha-
wani court to utilize its equitable powers. The public is allowed to util-
ize the shorelands of Hawaii while the upland owner's right to privacy
is preserved. Therein lies the virtue of the proposed approach. Com-
peting demands are compromised and resolved. Through the use of
this balancing, the public policy announced in Sotomura of the "extend-
ing to public use and ownership of as much of Hawaii's shoreline as
is reasonably possible!"1 2 will be met.
Michael D. Tom*
171. A waiver of a known right may be accomplished by an intentional relinquish-
ment or by such conduct that warrants an inference of the relinquishment of the known
right. Hewahewa v. Lalakea, 35 Hawaii 213, 219 (1939). See also 28 Am. Jun. 2d
Estoppel and Waiver § 154 (1966).
172. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Hawaii 1973).
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